We show that every feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multibidder mechanism for independent, additive bidders can be implemented as a mechanism that: (a) allocates every item independently of the other items; (b) for the allocation of each item it uses a strict ordering of all bidders' types; and allocates the item using a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms that iron this ordering into a non-strict ordering, and give the item uniformly at random to the bidders whose reported types dominate all other reported types according to the non-strict ordering. Combined with cyclicmonotonicity our results provide a characterization of feasible, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms in this setting.
find and exactly sample from a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms consistent with a given feasible reduced form. All these results generalize to multi-item reduced form auctions for independent, additive bidders. Finally, for multiple items, additive bidders with hard demand constraints, and arbitrary value correlation across items or bidders, we give a proper generalization of Border's Theorem, and characterize feasible reduced form auctions as multi-commodity flows in related multi-commodity flow instances. We also show that our generalization holds for a broader class of feasibility constraints, including the intersection of any two matroids.
As a corollary of our results we compute revenue-optimal, Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanisms in multiitem multi-bidder settings, when each bidder has arbitrarily correlated values over the items and additive valuations over bundles of items, and the bidders are independent. Our mechanisms run in time polynomial in the total number of bidder types (and not type profiles). This running time is polynomial in the number of bidders, but potentially exponential in the number of items. We improve the running time to polynomial in both the number of items and the number of bidders by using recent structural results on optimal BIC auctions in item-symmetric settings [DW11] .
INTRODUCTION
In its most general form mechanism design is the task of selecting outcomes and charging prices in a way that maximizes some objective such as revenue or social-welfare. Accordingly, to specify a mechanism one needs to provide two, possibly randomized, functions: one that maps bids to outcomes, and another mapping bids to prices charged to the bidders. Consider, e.g., a setting where n items are (simultaneously) auctioned to m bidders. For every possible collection of bids the mechanism needs to specify (a) a possibly randomized allocation of items to bidders; and (b) a possibly randomized collection of prices charged to them. The latter can be typically summarized by its expectation, which is just a vector of real numbers, recording the price charged to each bidder. But the former is a distribution over allocations and, in principle, would require (m + 1) n probabilities to be specified, making such explicit specification completely impractical. It turns out that this calculation is too pessimistic, and the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem allows one to summarize a randomized allocation by just providing its marginal allocation probabilities φ = {φij}ij, where φij is the probability that item j is given to bidder i [DFK11] . All that these probabilities need to satisfy to be consistent with a joint allocation distribution is that no item is given out more than once in expectation, and no bidder gets more items than she wants (if she has any demand constraints).
Yet, the above description is still too demanding as, even when every bidder can place c possible bids to specify her preferences over the items, there are c m possible bid vectors, and the mechanism needs to specify what to do for each. To decrease the specification complexity to linear in the number of bidders one can use the reduced form of the mechanism, which specifies a pair of possibly randomized allocation and price functions per bidder. In particular, if Ti denotes the possible bids that bidder i can submit, 1 the reduced form of the mechanism provides a collection R := {(πi : Ti → [0, 1] n , pi : Ti → R)}i of functions such that, for all ti ∈ Ti and all j, πij(ti) is the marginal probability (over the randomness in the mechanism and the uncertainty about the bids submitted by the other bidders) that item j is allocated to bidder i when she reports ti, and pi(ti) is the expected price she pays. Indeed, the functions πi and pi provide sufficient information for the bidder to decide what bid in Ti optimizes her utility in expectation. The trouble is that, unless the uncertainty over the other bids can be modeled probabilistically, the notion of a marginal allocation probability πij is ill-defined.
Indeed, one can go around this obstacle by making averagecase assumptions about the preferences of bidders [Mye81] . In particular, it is assumed that every bidder has a type ti ∈ Ti (forgive the temporary overload of notation), and that the joint type profile of the bidders is sampled from some known, joint distribution D over ×iTi. Now, the Revelation Principle implies that every auction is strategically equivalent to one where bidders submit not generic bids, but truthfully report their exact type. Hence w.l.o.g. we can restrict our attention to mechanisms where the bid space of bidder i is just Ti (EndOf overload of notation), and where the distribution of bids that bidders submit is exactly D. For such auctions, the reduced form is perfectly well-defined. But a challenge remains: What conditions are necessary and sufficient for a reduced form {πi}i to be feasible, i.e. correspond to a feasible auction (that never over-allocates items)? Can these conditions be verified in polynomial-time? And, given a feasible reduced form can we compute an auction implementing it in polynomial-time? Before studying these questions, why do we even care? Even without answers, mechanism design has made great progress in designing auctions, which optimize various objectives in a wide-range of settings. When the objective is social-welfare, there is an optimal auction with a very clean allocation rule, namely the VCG auction [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73] . The auction always chooses the welfare-maximizing allocation, and just charges prices to ensure incentive compatibility. When the objective is revenue, things get more murky. Still, when we are auctioning a single item to bidders whose values are independently sampled from known distributions, we can employ Myerson's celebrated, revenue-optimal auction [Mye81] . Its allocation rule is still rather clean: it always chooses the allocation that maximizes virtual surplus, and just charges prices to ensure incentive compatibility.
While in the above cases we have clean allocation rules, these results remain quite exceptional. In particular, there is no known simple characterization of the set of all feasible single-item mechanisms, and (prior to this work) it is unclear if there is one. Additionally, it seems unlikely that there is a clean allocation rule implementing the revenue-optimal multi-item mechanism. Understanding the set of feasible multi-item mechanisms is therefore a crucial step along the path to understanding revenue-optimal mechanisms in this setting.
Indeed, in the past decades a large body of research in Economics has been devoted to finding revenue-optimal mechanisms (extending Myeson's result) to multi-item settings, but progress has been sporadic (see survey [MV07] and its references). More recently the problem has entered Theory of Computation, and there has been a number of results obtaining constant factor approximations in polynomial time [Ala11, BGGM10, CHMS10] . Our slow progress towards exactly optimal mechanisms is intimately related to the lack of a characterization result of feasible mechanisms. Loosely speaking, all known algorithms optimize using relaxed feasibility constraints for the reduced form of the mechanism, such as "every item can be awarded at most once in expectation" [Ala11, BGGM10] or "the expected number of items awarded from every subset must not exceed its rank" [CHMS10] . Using such relaxed feasibility constraints, the optimal (possibly infeasible) reduced form is found. To turn this into a feasible reduced form, some "rounding procedure" is applied; this procedure may be just scaling the allocation probabilities down by a constant so that no item is over-allocated [Ala11, BGGM10] , or may invoke prophet inequalities [Ala11, CHMS10] . However, rounding comes with a loss in revenue. In view of this computational experience with the problem, it is crucial to try to characterize the feasible reduced forms exactly in a way that makes optimization tractable.
In this paper we carry out this program. We obtain characterization results for the set of all feasible single-item mechanisms (for independent bidders), as well as the set of all feasible multiple-item mechanisms when the bidders have arbitrarily correlated additive valuations over bundles of items (but there is no correlation across bidders). Our characterization results (explained in Section 3.2) are based on obtaining new, algorithmically constructive proofs of Border's theorem [Bor91] and recent extensions of this theorem [Bor07, CKM11] , which are overviewed in Section 3.1. Using these constructive proofs and our characterization results, we compute revenue-optimal, Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanisms in multi-item multi-bidder settings, when each bidder has arbitrarily correlated values over the items and additive valuations over bundles of items, and the bidders are independent. Our mechanisms run in time polynomial in the total number of bidder types, i |Ti|. This running time is polynomial in the number of bidders, but potentially exponential in the number of items. We improve the running time to polynomial in both the number of items and the number of bidders, by using recent structural results on optimal BIC auctions in symmetric settings [DW11] . These results are overviewed in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we present a generalization of Border's theorem to the multiitem setting where values are arbitrarily correlated across both items and bidders, and bidders have additive valuations with hard demand constraints, and provide a multicommodity flow interpretation of this problem. In addition, we show that our generalization holds for a broader class of feasibility constraints. Simply put, our generalization holds in all instances where the feasibility constraints can be written as a system of inequalities that are linear in the marginal allocation probabilities (φij's). This includes feasibility constraints that are the intersection of any two matroids, as well as many other set systems [Sch03] . After a brief enumeration of our theorems and a couple of figures summarizing our results, we fix our notation and proceed to the technical sections.
Our main results are the following:
1. Theorems 2 and 6 state our main algorithmic results.
We show that, if a reduced form auction for independent bidders and a single item is given to us as input, we can determine if the auction is feasible or not in polynomial-time. If it is feasible, we can compute a process that implements it in polynomial-time. If it is infeasible, then in polynomial-time we can provide a hyperplane separating it from the set of feasible reduced forms. These results extend to multi-item settings with additive, independent bidders and arbitrary correlation in the values of each bidder for the items.
2. Theorems 3 and 7 comprise the core of our characterization theorem. We show that every feasible reduced form auction for a single item and independent bidders can be implemented as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms. The hierarchical mechanisms in the support of the distribution are consistent with the same strict ordering of all bidders' types; and every mechanism irons this ordering into a non-strict ordering, and always allocates the item uniformly at random among the bidders whose reported types dominate all other reported types according to the non-strict ordering. Using these theorems we obtain a clean characterization of the allocation rule of all multidimensional mechanisms in multi-item settings with independent, additive bidders and arbitrary correlation in the values of each bidder for the items. Our general characterization result is provided in Section 3.2.
3. Theorem 4 provides our analog of Myerson's virtual values. It states that we can transform the πs, i.e. the marginal probabilities of a reduced form, into virtual πs such that the total ordering of the types (across different bidders) induced by the virtual πs allows us to, in linear time, verify the feasibility of a reduced form auction or output a hyperplane separating it from the set of feasible reduced forms.
4. Theorems 8 through 11 provide algorithms for the computation of revenue-optimal mechanisms in multi-bidder multi-item settings for independent bidders with additive valuations. Figure 2 summarizes our results, placing them in context of what was known before. We note that it is folklore knowledge how to compute the revenue-optimal mechanisms in time i |Ti| using linear programming (see, e.g., [DW11] ). The interesting aspect of the algorithms recorded in the figure is that they overcome the exponentiality of the running time in the number of bidders.
5. Finally, Theorem 12 proves a generalization of Border's Theorem to a broad class of feasibility constraints that includes the case of many items, many additive bidders with hard demand constraints, and arbitrary value correlation across items or bidders.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the current state of affairs on the two fronts studied in this paper. The first figure is on characterizing the allocation rule of feasible reduced forms and implementing it in polynomial-time, while the second is on solving the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem in polynomial-time. The second figure only records mechanisms that achieve optimal or near-optimal revenue, i.e. come -close to optimal revenue for arbitrary accuracy . In particular, we do not quote constant factor approximations [Ala11, BGGM10, CHMS10], which are not the focus of this work. The "Item-Symmetric" column of the second figure refers to settings that are symmetric with respect to the items (see Section 3.3 for a formal definition of such settings and [DW11] for a formal definition and discussion), while the "Bidder-Symmetric" column to settings that are symmetric with respect to the bidders (see Section 3.3 and [DW11]). Moreover, the "Many items, Few bidders" row refers to settings where the number of bidders is an absolute constant but the number of items, n, is allowed to scale, and the "Few items, Many bidders" row refers to settings where the number of items is held constant but the number of bidders, m, is allowed to scale. In the cells of the same table we stress components of the running time/the setting that are the best we could hope for, and do not stress components that could be improved upon, leaving these improvements to future work. Finally, we use MHR to denote Monotone Hazard Rate (see Section 2 for a formal definition of MHR distributions) and we also use the concept of a polynomial-time approximation scheme, which is formally defined in Section 2.
Related Work.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of a single-item bidder-symmetric reduced form was provided by Border [Bor91] , building on prior work by Maskin and Riley [MR84] and Matthews [Mat84] . A simpler proof of Border's theorem and alternative criteria for feasibility were also provided by Hart and Reny [HR11] . Border's condition for the symmetric setting was generalized to the asymmetric setting by Border [Bor07] and Che et al. [CKM11] . Nevertheless, these results cannot be exploited algorithmically to compute optimal mechanisms, because either they do not lead to polynomial-time separation oracles for the feasibility of a reduced form, or they do not allow for implementing the computed reduced forms in polynomial-time, or both. The results of the present paper fill this gap, and at the same time provide a compelling characterization of the allocation rule of all feasible single-item mechanisms, as well as multi-item mechanisms for independent, additive bidders. The bidders are assumed to be additive up to (if stated) some hard demand constraint. Both lines of the table allow correlation of values across different items, but the first row assumes that bidders have independent valuations while the second also allows correlation across bidders.
A manuscript with our results and all proofs that have been omitted from this extended abstract due to space constraints can be found on arxiv.org (submission date: December 20, 2011) [CDW11] . It has been communicated to us by [AFH + 11] that, independently from our work, they had also obtained polynomial-time algorithms for checking the feasibility of a given single-item reduced form, when the bidders are independent, as well algorithms for implementing the reduced form, if it is feasible (i.e. a result that would accompany our result in the top row and middle column of Figure 1 but only for single-item reduced forms). A manuscript with their results can be found on arxiv.org (submission date: March 22, 2012) [AFH + 12].
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Throughout the paper, we denote the number of bidders by m and the number of items by n. We also use Ti to denote the types of bidder i. We make no assumptions about Ti except that it is measurable. In particular, it is not assumed that Ti is a subset of R, and it could well be multidimensional; e.g., when a bidder has additive valuations, the type of the bidder could be just a vector specifying how much she values each of the items. To obtain computationally meaningful results, we assume in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 that the type sets {Ti}i are finite (as opposed to continuous/infinite, but not of constant size), and in this case use c as a shorthand for maxi |Ti|. However, our results in Section 3.3 apply also to continuous type spaces, since when the type distributions are bounded or when they are unbounded but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate tail condition, 2 we can truncate and discretize the support of the distribution and still get nearly optimal -BIC mechanisms (Definition 1) using the techniques of [CD11] or [DW11] . We can then employ the -BIC to BIC reduction of [DW11] to get nearly optimal BIC mechanisms. See Section 3.3 for details.
To ease notation, we just use A (B, C, etc.) to denote the type of a bidder, without emphasizing whether it is a vector or a scalar. The elements of ×iTi are called type profiles, and specify a type for every bidder. We assume type profiles are sampled from a distribution D over ×iTi. We denote by Di the marginal of this distribution on bidder i's type, and use D−i to denote the marginal of D over the types of all bidders, except bidder i. We use ti for the random 2 We say that a one-dimensional differentiable distribution F satisfies Monotone Hazard Rate, or succinctly MHR, if
is monotonically non-decreasing in its domain, where f = F is the probability density function. variable representing the type of bidder i. So when we write Pr[ti = A], we mean the probability that bidder i's type is A. In the i.i.d. case, because Pr[ti = A] is the same for all i, we will just write Pr[A].
The reduced form of a mechanism is a vector function π(·), specifying values πij(A), for all items j, bidders i and types A ∈ Ti. πij(A) is the probability that bidder i receives item j when reporting type A, where the probability is over the randomness of all other bidders' types and the internal randomness of the mechanism, assuming that the other bidders report their true types to the mechanism. When we only consider a single item (case n = 1), we drop the item subscript from the πij's, writing πi(A) for the probability that the item is allocated to bidder i. In this case we may think of π(·) as a vector in [0, 1] i |T i | . To emphasize the vectorview of the reduced form we may write π for the reduced form.
Sometimes we will be considering settings where the bidders are i.i.d., i.e. Ti = T i = T , for all i and i , and D is a product distribution over ×iTi with the same marginal on every bidder. In such settings, we may be looking at biddersymmetric reduced forms, satisfying πij(A) = π i j (A), for all j, i, i , A ∈ T . In such cases, we will drop the bidder subscript from the πij's, writing πj(A), for the probability that a bidder of type A ∈ T receives item j, over the randomness of the mechanism and the types of the other bidders, assuming that the other bidders report their true types to the mechanism. If there is a single item and the reduced form is bidder-symmetric, we will drop both subscripts writing π(A) for the same probability. In this case, we may think of the reduced form as a vector π in [0, 1] |T | .
Given a reduced form π of a mechanism we will be interested in whether the form can be "implemented". By this we mean designing a feasible mechanism M (i.e. one that never over-allocates items) such that the probability Mij(A) that bidder i receives item j when she reports type A to the mechanism is exactly πij(A), where the probability is computed with respect to the randomness in the mechanism and the randomness in the types of the other bidders, assuming that the other bidders report their true types to the mechanism. In fact, we will relax this requirement and say that a mechanism M implements the reduced form π if Mij(A) ≥ πij(A), for all i, j, A. This is because we can trivially modify such a mechanism so that all constraints are tight. Indeed, if Mij(A) = x·πij(A) for some i, j, A, x > 1, we can rectify the mechanism as follows: whenever M wants to allocate item j to bidder i when he has reported type A, we instead throw the item away with probability x−1
x . It's easy to see that [this work] §: For all > 0, a (1 − )-fraction of the optimal revenue is achieved in the quoted running time. 1/ appears in the exponent of the running time. †: Exactly optimal revenue is achieved in the quoted running time, when every marginal of the bidders' value distributions has constant size support. The size of the support appears in the exponent of the running time. When the size of the support is non-constant/infinite/unbounded, two types of polynomial-time approximation schemes are obtained:
• When every marginal is MHR, a (1 − )-fraction of the optimal revenue is achieved in the quoted running time, for all > 0. • When the value distributions are bounded and normalized to [0, 1] n , an additive approximation to the optimal revenue is achieved in the quoted running time, for all > 0. The approximation error is · min{n, i Ci}, where Ci is the demand constraint of bidder i (if any). ‡: Exactly optimal revenue is achieved in the quoted running time, where recall that Ti is the support of the value distribution of bidder i. When the supports are infinite/unbounded we can alternatively obtain two types of approximation schemes:
• When every marginal of the bidders' value distributions is MHR, a (1 − )-fraction of the optimal revenue is achieved in time polynomial in m and (1/ ) n , for all > 0. • When the value distributions are bounded and normalized to [0, 1] n , an additive approximation to the optimal revenue is achieved in time polynomial in m and (1/ ) n , for all > 0. In this case, the approximation error is · n.
(Even though (1/ ) n is exponential in the number of items, notice that to specify a general (i.e. non-product and non-symmetric) value-distribution over n items we need to pay description complexity exponential in the number of items n. I.e. the input size to our problem is already exponential in n in this case.) this results in Mij(A) = πij(A). When Mij(A) = πij(A) for all i, j, A, we will say that M exactly implements π. Finally, if a reduced form can be implemented by a mechanism, we say that the reduced form is feasible. When a bidder is additive, we may write vi to denote her type, with the convention that vij represents her value for item j and that her value for a bundle of items is just the sum of her values for the items in the bundle. Then, to fully specify a (direct-revelation) multi-item mechanism for additive bidders, we need to describe, potentially succinctly, for all type profiles v ∈ ×iTi, and for every bidder i, the outcome Mi( v) = ( φi( v), pi( v)) given by M to bidder i, when the reported bidder types are v, where φij( v) is the probability that item j is given to bidder i and pi( v) is the price that i pays. The value of bidder i for outcome Mi( w) is just her expected value vi · φi( w) for the bundle allocated to her, while the utility of bidder i for the same outcome is U ( vi, Mi( w)) := vi · φi( w) − pi( w). Such bidders subtracting price from expected value are called quasi-linear. The relation between φ's and π's is just the following: for all i, vi ∈ Ti:
where the ex-pectation is computed with respect to the values v−i of all bidders except i as these are drawn from D−i. We conclude by formally defining Bayesian Incentive Compatibility:
). (BIC/ -BIC Mechanism) A mechanism M is called -BIC iff the following inequality holds for all i, vi, wi:
where vmax is the maximum possible value of any bidder for any item in the support of the value distribution. In other words, M is -BIC iff when a bidder lies by reporting wi instead of vi, they do not expect to gain more than vmax times the expected number of items that wi receives. A mechanism is called BIC iff it is 0-BIC. 3 We conclude our preliminaries section noting that the running times of the algorithms obtained in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are quoted without accounting for the number of bits needed to represent a coordinate of π. If bits are needed to describe a probability in π, then it suffices to multiply all quoted running times by a poly( ) factor. Moreover, in Sections 3.3 and 8 we use the concept of a polynomialtime approximation scheme, or PTAS for short. A PTAS for a family of computational problems, such as computing the revenue-optimal mechanism in multi-item multi-bidder settings, is a collection of algorithms (A ) , indexed by the approximation parameter , such that, for all > 0 and for any given problem P in the family, Algorithm A computes an -optimal solution to P in time time d(P) g(1/ ) , where d(P) is the number of bits required to describe problem P and g is some increasing function of 1/ , which does not depend on P or its description complexity. The algorithms in the collection are called polynomial-time because for all fixed , e.g. = 1/10, the running time of A is polynomial in the description of the problem.
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS AND TECH-NIQUES

Feasible Reduced Forms
3.1.1 Single-item, Bidder-Symmetric Reduced Forms, i.i.d.
Bidders
In the case of a single item and i.i.d. bidders, Border provided a necessary and sufficient condition for a biddersymmetric reduced form to be feasible, generalizing prior partial results of Maskin-Riley [MR84] and Matthews [Mat84] . In [HR11] a simple proof and alternative criteria are also provided. Let us review Border's theorem.
Theorem 1 ([Bor91]
). Suppose that the bidder's types are i.i.d. distributed according to some measure µ over T . Then a bidder-symmetric reduced form π is feasible if an only if
Simply put, a reduced form is feasible if and only if the probability that the item is awarded to a type in some set S (as computed by the reduced form) is at most the probability that someone with type from S shows up to the auction (as computed by the type distribution), for all subsets of types S ⊆ T . We call a set that violates this condition a constricting set. Clearly, the existence of a constricting set bears witness that the reduced form is infeasible, as the auctioneer cannot possibly award the item to someone in S if no one in S shows up. Border's theorem states that this is in fact a sufficient condition. Border's original paper considered continuous type spaces (hence the integral in (1)), and the proof was based on measure theory. The following extension of the theorem was also shown: If there exists a constricting set S, then there is also a constricting set of the form Sx, where Sx = {A|π(A) > x}, for some x. In the case of finite type spaces, we can determine the feasibility of a reduced form auction in time O(c log c + c · m), where c = |T |, as after sorting the type space in decreasing π's there are only c different subsets of the form Sx, and a dynamic program can find us if any of them violates (1) in time O(c·m). In other words, determining the feasibility of a bidder-symmetric reduced form, for a single item, and many i.i.d. bidders is easy. However, the following important question was left unanswered: Given a feasible reduced form, can we obtain a mechanism implementing the reduced form in polynomial-time? Notice that answering this question in the affirmative is absolutely necessary to be able to run the auction specified by the given reduced form. Our first contribution is solving this problem.
Theorem 2. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 1, given a bidder-symmetric reduced form π we can determine if it is feasible, or find a hyperplane separating it from the set of feasible bidder-symmetric reduced forms, in time O(c · (log c+m)), where c = |T |. If the reduced form is feasible, we provide a succinct description of a mechanism implementing the reduced form, in time polynomial in c · m. The description of the mechanism is (at most) c + 1 probabilities and an equal number of ironings of the ordering on T induced by π. 4 The mechanism itself runs as follows: given the reported type profile, the mechanism samples a random subset of bidders in time poly(m, c), and the item is allocated uniformly at random to some bidder in that subset, or the item is thrown away.
We prove Theorem 2 in Section 6, as a corollary of Theorem 13 and Proposition 1 of Sections 5 and 6 respectively. In proving our result, we consider the following type of mechanisms:
Definition 2. A hierarchical mechanism consists of a function H : T → [|T |] ∪ {LOSE}; one should interpret LOSE as a value larger than |T |. On bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), the mechanism has the following behavior: If H(Ai) = LOSE for all i, the mechanism throws the item away. Otherwise, the item is awarded uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i H(Ai).
In other words, a hierarchical mechanism breaks down the type space into a hierarchy. When the bidders arrive and submit their types, the mechanism finds the highest-priority level of the hierarchy that is populated by the submitted types, and gives the item uniformly at random to a bidder whose type falls in that level of the hierarchy (unless every bidder is a loser, in which case the mechanism throws the item away). We say that a hierarchical mechanism H is well-ordered w.
We prove the following characterization result about feasible bidder-symmetric reduced forms:
Theorem 3. When bidders are i.i.d., every feasible biddersymmetric reduced form π can be exactly implemented as a distribution over at most |T | + 1 well-ordered with respect to π hierarchical mechanisms. Remark 1. We note that Border [Bor91] already showed a similar theorem to the one above, namely that every feasible bidder-symmetric reduced form can be implemented as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms. The subtle, albeit qualitatively important difference between Border's result and ours is this: we show that every hierarchical mechanism in the support of the distribution is consistent with the same ordering of the type-set T , which every hierarchical mechanism in the support of the distribution "irons" in some way. In particular, the types are ranked from more to less important according to π and the mechanisms in the support of the distribution iron various regions of this ranking, thereby treating the types falling in an ironed region equally. On the other hand, Border's result does not require the mechanisms in the support of the distribution to be consistent with a unique total ordering of the type-set T . So it is a less compelling characterization of the structure of the allocation rule.
Theorem 3 alone is not enough to allow us to implement a given bidder-symmetric reduced form. Indeed, if π(·) takes θ (can be as large as |T |) distinct values, there are 2 θ different well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. From here, we switch to our vector-view of reduced forms (as vectors π in [0, 1] |T | ) and study the geometry of the space of feasible mechanisms respecting the order on the type-space induced by a given reduced form π, which we will call P . We show that, in fact, P is a θ-dimensional polytope whose corners are exactly the 2 θ different well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. We provide a geometric algorithm in Section 5 that in polynomial time outputs a representation of π as a convex combination of at most |T | + 1 corners of P . This convex combination is exactly a distribution over wellordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms that implements π. Our geometric algorithm runs in time poly(m, |T |), and sampling from the distribution output by our algorithm also takes time poly(m, |T |). We provide the details of our approach and proofs of the relevant claims in Sections 5 and 6.
Single-item, General Reduced Forms, Non-i.i.d. Bidders
Recently, an alternative proof of Border's theorem for distributions with finite support was discovered in [Bor07] and again in [CKM11] , the latter using a clean networkflow interpretation. These proofs extend Theorem 1 to independent, but not necessarily identical, bidders and nonsymmetric reduced forms. In this case, (1) is replaced by the following necessary and sufficient condition:
The interpretation of the LHS and RHS of the above inequality is the same as the one given above for (1) except generalized to the non-iid non-symmetric setting. In addition to the above condition, [CKM11] proves a generalization of Border's extended result: If there is a constricting S = (S1, . . . , Sm), then there is also a constricting set of the form S = (S (1)
In other words, each bidder has a different threshold xi, and S (i)
x i contains all types of bidder i with πi above xi. Unfortunately, despite this simplification, there are still i (|Ti| + 1) possible constricting sets, and testing each of them would take time exponential in the number of bidders.
One might hope to obtain a stronger theorem that would only require testing a number of sets polynomial in i |Ti| and m. We prove such a theorem by introducing a notion of a virtual π, defined next. We name it such not because the equation involves hazard rates or looks anything like that for virtual valuations [Mye81] , but because the spirit of the transformation is the same. Myerson observed that he could make the most revenue not from the bidder with the highest valuation, but from the bidder with the highest virtual valuation. Likewise, in our setting, the most difficult types to satisfy are not the types with the highest π, but the types with the highest virtual π. The definition of virtual π, which we denoteπ, is actually quite simple. It turns out that this definition exactly captures which types of different bidders are harder to satisfy. In the biddersymmetric case of Section 3.1.1, we were able to compare a pair of types A and B submitted by bidders i = k based only on their corresponding πi(A) and π k (B). This is no longer the case in the non-iid case, resulting in the more complicated constricting sets defined above. Nevertheless, we show that A and B can be compared at face value of πi(A) andπ k (B):
Theorem 4. Suppose that the bidders are independent and there is a single item for sale. A reduced form π is feasible if and only if: for all x, the sets S
In particular, we can test the feasibility of a reduced form, or obtain a hyperplane separating the reduced form from the set of feasible reduced forms, in time linear in i |Ti| · log i |Ti| + m . The details of the proof can be found in Section 7.
We also provide two analogs of Theorem 3 in our setting: Theorem 5, which is handy for our algorithmic results of Theorem 6, and Theorem 7, which provides a more compelling characterization of feasible reduced forms. Both theorems are in terms of hierarchical mechanisms which in the present setting are defined as follows.
Definition 4. A hierarchical mechanism consists of a function H : i (Ti × {i}) → [ i |Ti|] ∪ {LOSE}; one should interpret LOSE as a value larger than i |Ti|. On bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), if H(Ai, i) = LOSE for all i, the mechanism throws the item away. Otherwise, the item is awarded uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i H(Ai, i).
We say that a hierarchical mechanism H for non-identical bidders is partially-ordered w.r.t. π if for all i and A, A ∈ Ti, πi(A) ≥ πi(A ) ⇒ H(A, i) ≤ H(A , i). We say that a hierarchical mechanism is strict if for all bidders i, j and types A ∈ Ti, B ∈ Tj: i = j ⇒ (H(A, i) = H(B, j) ∨ H(A, i) = H(B, j) = LOSE) (i.e. there is always a unique winner in argmin i H(Ai, i) if one exists, because each level (except possibly for LOSE) contains types from only a single bidder). Our algorithmic extension of Theorem 3 is the following:
Theorem 5. When bidders are independent, but not necessarily identically distributed, every feasible reduced form π can be exactly implemented as a distribution over at most i |Ti|+1 strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms.
From here, we take the same geometric approach as in Section 3.1.1 and study the geometry of the set of feasible reduced forms that respect the partial-ordering of types induced by a given reduced-form π. Again we show that this is a ( i di)-dimensional polytope, P , where di (could be as large as |Ti|) is the number of distinct values that πi(·) takes on input from Ti, and that the corners of P are exactly the strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. Writing a point in P as a convex combination of i |Ti| + 1 corners is no longer an easy procedure. Not only does P have an exponential number of corners, but there are also exponentially many hyperplanes defining the boundary of P (where there were only 2 · |T | such hyperplanes in the i.i.d. case). Luckily, Theorem 4 provides a polynomial-time separation oracle for membership in P . By making use of this separation oracle instead of checking the exponentially-many boundary equations one by one, the geometric algorithm of Section 5 outputs a representation of a given π as a convex combination of at most i |Ti| + 1 corners of P , which is exactly a distribution over the corresponding i |Ti|+1 strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. Putting this approach together with Theorems 4 and 5, we prove in Section 7 the algorithmic result of this section: Theorem 6. When bidders are independent, given a reduced form we can determine if it is feasible, or find a hyperplane separating it from the set of feasible reduced forms, in time linear in i |Ti| · log i |Ti| + m . If the reduced form is feasible, we can compute a succinct description of a mechanism implementing the reduced form, in time polynomial in i |Ti|. The description of the mechanism is just (at most) i |Ti| + 1 probabilities and the same number of total orderings of i (Ti × {i}). The mechanism itself runs as follows: given the reported type profile, the mechanism samples a random total ordering of all bidders' types in time polynomial in i |Ti|, and allocates the item to the bidder whose reported type is highest in that ordering, or throws the item away.
While Theorem 5 does provide some structure to the otherwise unknown set of feasible mechanisms for independent bidders, the result is not as compelling as that of Theorem 3. One might have hoped that every feasible reduced form can be implemented as a distribution over virtually-ordered hierarchical mechanisms (that is, hierarchical mechanisms such thatπi(A) ≥πj(B) ⇒ H(A, i) ≤ H(B, j)). Unfortunately, this is not true, as is shown in Section 7. Despite this, we show that a strong generalization of Theorem 3 holds in this setting. Let σ be a total ordering on the elements of
We say that σ respects π if πi(A) > πi(B) ⇒ σ(A, i) < σ(B, i). We also say that a hierachical mechanism H is σ-
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7. If a reduced form π is feasible, there exists a total ordering σ on the elements of i (Ti ×{i}) that respects π such that π can be implemented as a distribution over σordered hierarchical mechanisms.
Remark 2. The analog of Remark 1 applies here too. It is not hard to extend Border's proof to show that every feasible reduced form can be implemented as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms. The interesting aspect of Theorem 7 is that there exists a total ordering of the types of all bidders so that every hierarchical mechanism in the support of the distribution is consistent with this ordering. Indeed, Theorem 7 is qualitatively a stronger statement than its analog in symmetric settings (Theorem 3) as the geometric argument used for the proof of Theorem 3 falls short from giving Theorem 7, resulting in the partially ordered hierarchical mechanisms of Theorem 5.
We provide the proof of Theorem 7 in the full version of our paper [CDW11].
A Simple Characterization of Feasible Multidimensional Mechanisms
The appeal of Myerson's single-item auction is not only its optimality, but its clean allocation rule. Let us revisit it. In a single-item setting the type-set of each bidder is a subset Ti ⊂ R, as a bidder's type is how much she values the item. In brush strokes Myerson's allocation rule is then as follows. We present both the symmetric and the asymmetric case, as the symmetric one is even simpler.
• The i.i.d. case: Suppose that the bidders' values are independently and identically distributed in T . Myerson's auction in this setting maintains an ironing of the types
the ranking respects the order on T (as a subset of R). If |H −1 (k)| > 1 for some k, we can think of the types in H −1 (k) as having been ironed over by H. In fact, let us refer to H as an ironing of T . Given the ironing H, the allocation rule is simple: on bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), the item is allocated uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i {H(Ai)} (other tie-breaking rules are fine too), or thrown away if H(Ai) = LOSE, ∀i.
• The non-i.i.d. case: Suppose that the bidders' values are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. In this case, Myerson's allocation rule is a bit more complicated. The auction maintains an ironing of all bidders' types H : ∪i(Ti × {i}) → [ i |Ti|] ∪ {LOSE} (take LOSE := i |Ti| + 1) satisfying: for all bidders i, Ai ≥ A i =⇒ H(Ai, i) ≤ H(A i , i); i.e. the ironing now only respects the order between types belonging to the same bidder. Given the ironing, the allocation rule is simple: on bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), the item is allocated uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i {H(Ai, i)}, or thrown away if H(Ai, i) = LOSE for all i.
Simply put, Myerson's allocation rule maintains a strict ordering of all bidders' types together with an ironing of this ordering into a non-strict ordering, and a LOSE threshold. When the bidders submit their types, the auction gives the item uniformly at random to a bidder whose submitted type populates the highest level of the ironing, unless no type is above the LOSE threshold in which case the item remains unallocated.
In multi-item auctions, the type spaces of the bidders are subsets Ti ⊂ R n , i.e. are multidimensional, and it is a priori not clear how to order them for the purposes of allocating items. In fact, it is not clear whether feasible mechanisms/optimal mechanisms in these settings always have simple allocation rules. Indeed, it is not even clear that all feasible single-item auctions have a clean allocation rule, such as Myerson's allocation rule described above. In this work, we show a compelling characterization result of all feasible multi-item auctions when the bidders are independent, each bidder's type is sampled from an arbitrary distribution over her type space (i.e. we do not assume that the bidder's values for the items are necessarily independent), and the bidders have additive valuations over bundles of items. In particular, our results also characterize the set of all feasible single-item mechanisms.
As our characterization aims to characterize a broader set of mechanisms, the allocation rules it contains are necessarily more involved, albeit slightly. All we do is introduce randomization over ironings. Simply put, our characterization of multi-item multi bidder mechanisms with independent additive bidders is as follows. The reader should draw immediate connections between the allocation rule we are about to describe and Myerson's allocation rule described above.
Characterization of Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions for Independent Additive Bidders (informal)
Every multi-bidder multi-item auction for independent, additive bidders takes the following form w.l.o.g.:
• Every item is allocated independently of the other items.
• The allocation rule of every item maintains:
-a strict ordering of all bidders' types; and -a distribution over ironings of the strict ordering into non-strict orderings, and LOSE thresholds.
• Each item is then allocated as follows. First, a random ironing and LOSE threshold is sampled from the item's distribution. Then, the item is given uniformly at random to a bidder whose reported type populates the highest level of the sampled ironing, unless no type is above the sampled LOSE threshold in which case the item remains unallocated.
We proceed with a formal description of our characterization result. As in multi-item auctions the bidders' type-sets are multidimensional, it is helpful to view the reduced form of the auction as providing us with natural embeddings of the type-sets of bidders into R. Indeed, for our discussion it will be useful to view πij(·) as an embedding of Ti into R, for each bidder i and item j. As we did earlier with Myerson's allocation rule, we distinguish between the symmetric and the asymmetric cases.
Characterization of Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions for Independent Additive Bidders (formal)
Every multi-bidder multi-item auction for independent, additive bidders is equivalent to one that allocates every item independently of the other items, and one in which the allocation of item j, for all j, takes the following form:
• i.i.d. bidders and bidder-symmetric reduced forms: Suppose that the bidders are i.i.d. and the reduced form πj on item j is bidder-symmetric. In this case, the auction maintains a distribution Hj over rankings Hj :
i.e. each ranking in the support of Hj respects the order induced on T by its embedding into R by πj(·). If |H −1 j (k)| > 1 for some k and some ranking Hj in the support of Hj we think of the types in H −1 j (k) as having been ironed over by Hj. Given Hj, the allocation of item j is simple: on bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), a ranking Hj is sampled from Hj, and the item is allocated uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i {Hj(Ai)}, or thrown away if Hj(Ai) = LOSE for all i.
• Non-i.i.d. bidders or different reduced forms: When the bidders are independent but non-i.i.d. or the reduced form on item j is not bidder-symmetric, the auction maintains a distribution Hj over rankings Hj : ∪i(Ti × {i}) → [ i |Ti|]∪{LOSE} (take LOSE := i |Ti| + 1) satisfying: for all bidders i, πij(A) ≥ πij(A ) =⇒ Hj(A, i) ≤ Hj(A , i); i.e. each ranking in the support respects the order between types belonging to the same bidder, for whatever order is induced on Ti by its embedding into R by πij(·). Additionally, if Hj and H j are two rankings in the support of Hj then, for all i, i , Ai ∈ Ti, A i ∈ T i :
all rankings in the support of Hj are consistent with a unique total ordering of ∪i(Ti × {i}). Given Hj, the allocation of item j is simple: on bid vector (A1, . . . , Am), a ranking Hj is sampled from Hj, and the item is allocated uniformly at random to a bidder in argmin i {Hj(Ai, i)}, or thrown away if Hj(Ai, i) = LOSE for all i.
Our characterization result for single-item settings is an immediate corollary of Theorems 3 (for the i.i.d. case) and 7 (for the independent case). That the above characterization holds for multi-item settings and additive bidders follows by noting that, given the lack of demand constraints on the bidders, we can allocate items sequentially and the resulting allocation will be feasible given that the supply constraints on the items are met, i.e. every item is allocated exactly once.
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
The additivity of the bidders notwithstanding, we know that optimal mechanisms in multi-item settings may be quite involved. For example, in [CMS10] it is shown that even when there are two items, and a single additive bidder whose values over the items are i.i.d. regular, a mechanism that sells lotteries over the items makes strictly more revenue than a mechanism that sells each item separately. This result implies that: we should not auction every item separately; and we should use the values of bidders on item j to decide how to allocate item j . So if bidder i reports higher value on item j than bidder i , we should not necessarily expect item j to go to bidder i more often than bidder i , even if the bidders are i.i.d.. To rephrase, for allocating item j , we cannot just rank the bidders according to their bids on that particular item. We need to instead take into account their bids on all the other items.
Despite such complications, it is possible to use Theorems 2 and 6 to solve the following problem:
The BIC many-many problem. Given as input m arbitrarily correlated distributions F1, . . . , Fm over valuation vectors for n items, output a BIC mechanism M whose expected revenue is optimal relative to any other, possibly randomized, BIC mechanism, when played by m additive bidders whose valuation vectors are sampled independently from F1, . . . , Fm.
Our approach to solving this problem is to use the separation oracle of Theorems 2 and 6 inside the LPs of [DW11] . Doing so we obtain the following:
Theorem 8. There is a solution to the BIC many-many problem with running time polynomial in n, m and in max i∈ [m] |supp(Fi)|.
Theorem 9. If, for all i, Fi is item-symmetric (i.e. invariant under permutations of the item names), there exists a solution to the BIC many-many problem with runtime polynomial in m and n c , where c = maxi,j |supp(Fij)|, where Fij is the marginal of Fi on item j.
Theorem 10. If, for all i, Fi is item-symmetric and supported on [0, 1] n there is an additive PTAS for the BIC many-many problem whose running time is polynomial in m and n (and doesn't depend on the size of the support of F1, . . . , Fm). For all > 0, the PTAS computes a BIC mechanism whose revenue is within an additive · n of the optimal revenue achieved by any BIC mechanism.
Theorem 11. If, for all i, Fi is item-symmetric and its n marginals satisfy the MHR condition, there is a multiplicative PTAS for the BIC many-many problem whose running time is polynomial in m and n (and doesn't depend on the size of the support of F1, . . . , Fm). For all > 0, the PTAS computes a BIC mechanism whose revenue is at least a (1− )-fraction of the optimal revenue achieved by any BIC mechanism.
Further details are provided in Section 8.
Non-negative Linear Feasibility Constraints
Aside from the independent results of [AFH + 11], it is unknown whether Border's theorem applies to other settings, or what the proper statement of Border's Theorem might even be as we depart from the single-item setting. On this front, we prove a generalization of Border's Theorem to settings with Non-negative Linear Feasibility Constraints. Throughout this section, P denotes a type profile, and φ(P ) denotes an allocation in terms of the marginal probability of giving bidder i item j, φij(P ), when the reported type profile is P . We are interested in the form of the region F where φ(P ) needs to lie for there to exist a distribution over feasible allocations of items to bidders consistent with the marginal allocation probabilities specified by φ(P ). In the following definition, we represent an inequality h as a vector of coefficients c(h), and a right-hand bound d(h). We say that h is non-negative if every coefficient cij(h) and d(h) are non-negative.
Definition 5. A set of feasible allocations F ⊆ [0, 1] m×n has Non-negative Linear Feasibility Constraints if there exists a set H of non-negative inequalities such that φ(P ) ∈ F ⇔ c(h) · φ(P ) ≤ d(h), for all h ∈ H, and φ(P ) ≥ 0). 5
In a setting where no bidder i should be given more than Ci items and no item j should be given out more than once, an application of the Birkhoff-Von Neumann Theorem implies that F has non-negative linear feasibility constraints [DFK11, DW11] . 6 In fact, it is shown in [Sch03] that a much broader range of settings have non-negative linear feasibility constraints, including settings where the constraint on the feasible allocations of items to bidders S ⊆ [m] × [n] can be specified as the intersection of two arbitrary matroids. 7 Below is our generalization of Border's Theorem to this setting, whose proof can be found in the full version of our paper [CDW11] . In the statement of the theorem, i ranges over all bidders, j ranges over all items, and P ranges over all possible type-profiles, with Pr[P ] denoting the probability that profile P is sampled from D and Pi denoting the type of bidder i in P . In other words, for fixed weights − → W = {Wij(A)}i,j,A, consider the allocation rule M ( − → W ) that on profile P picks the max-weight allocation (where the weight of giving item j to bidder i is Wij(Pi)). Then a reduced form π is feasible if and only if for all weights − → W , the LHS is at most the expected weight of items awarded by M ( − → W ).
Like in the single-item setting, it is clear that this is a necessary condition. The expected weight of items awarded by any mechanism that implements π is exactly the LHS, and this value clearly must be less than the expected weight of items awarded by M ( − → W ), as M maximizes this value over all feasible mechanisms. The content of the theorem is that these conditions are indeed sufficient.
In addition to a proof of Theorem 12, we provide in [CDW11] two false generalizations of Border's Theorem that fail even for unit-demand i.i.d. bidders in order to motivate the statement of Theorem 12.
Correlated Bidders, Demand Constraints
As mentioned previously, without demand constraints and without correlation among bidders' valuations, the multiitem allocation problem is no more difficult than the singleitem allocation problem, as each item can just be allocated separately and independently from the other items. However, either demand constraints or correlation among bidders negates all known results (including those of Section 3.1) about feasible allocations. On this front, we give a multicommodity flow interpretation of the problem for arbitrarily correlated bidders with demand constraints, which is similar to the network flow interpretation of [CKM11] . Simply put, the commodities/goods in our multi-commodity flow problem are denoted Gij(A), for all items j, bidders i, and types A ∈ Ti. We have a source node for every item, an intermediate node for every possible profile, and a sink node for every type. We put edges from every item node to every intermediate node and every intermediate node to every sink node. The capacities on the source-intermediate edges are chosen to ensure that each item is only given out once. The capacities on the intermediate-sink edges are chosen to ensure that no bidder violates his demand constraint. We then demand that a πij(A)· Pr[ti = A] amount of commodity Gij(A) is sent from source node j to sink node (i, A). We give the details of our flow network and the values of the capacities on its edges in [CDW11] , and also explain how to view any solution to the multi-commodity flow problem as a mechanism that implements the reduced form and vice versa.
ROADMAP TO THE TECHNICAL SEC-TIONS
Sections 5-8 provide some of the technical details omitted from Section 3 for the sake of coherence. Section 5 is a preparatory section, providing a geometric algorithm for decomposing a point in a polytope as a convex combination of the polytope's corners, when the polytope is not given explicitly to us but indirectly via oracles certifying its facets and accessing its corners. Section 6 provides the technical details omitted from Section 3.1.1, while Section 7 contains the technical details omitted from Section 3.1.2, except for the proof of our main characterization result (Theorem 7) that we provide in the full version of our paper [CDW11] . Finally, Section 8 contains our results for the computation of revenue-optimal mechanisms outlined in Section 3.3. Our extension of Border's theorem beyond single-item settings with independent bidders stated in Section 3.4 is given in the full version of our paper [CDW11] .
A GEOMETRIC ALGORITHM
Carathéodory's theorem states that every point x inside an n-dimensional polytope P can be written as a convex combination of at most n + 1 corners of P . In this section, we provide an algorithm for coming up with such a combination. We will consider polytopes that are described as an intersection of half-spaces. Each half-space is defined by a hyperplane h together with a choice of a side. We use B(P ) to denote the set of half-spaces defining polytope P , but overload notation using B(P ) to also denote the corresponding set of hyperplanes. We reserve the symbol h to denote hyperplanes. We consider cases where |B(P )| may be exponentially large, and we only have an implicit description of B(P ). That is, we have access to a boundary oracle BO that outputs yes on input h if h ∈ B(P ), and no otherwise. We also have access to a separation oracle, SO, that outputs yes on input x if x ∈ P , and outputs some h ∈ B(P ) if x is on the wrong side of h (and therefore not in P ). We will talk about one more algorithm related to P : Definition 6. CO is a corner oracle for P if it has the following behavior. Given as input a set of hyperplanes B, CO outputs no if B ⊆ B(P ), or h∈B h P = ∅ (i.e. the hyperplanes are not boundary hyperplanes of P , or they are boundary hyperplanes, but do not intersect inside P ). Otherwise, CO outputs a corner of P inside h∈B h.
It is clear that CO has well-defined behavior on all inputs. If B contains only boundary hyperplanes of P , and the intersection of these hyperplanes with P is non-empty, this region must contain a corner of P . Now we describe our computational problem in terms of these oracles: Question 1. Given as input a point x ∈ R n , a separation oracle SO and a corner oracle CO for some n-dimensional polytope P , as well as an upper bound b on the number of bits required to describe a coefficient in the hyperplanes output by SO as well as any coordinate of x, output no if x / ∈ P . Otherwise, output c1, . . . , cn+1, a1, . . . , an+1 such that ai is a corner of P for all i, i ci = 1, and i ci ai = x.
It follows from Carathéodory's theorem that such ci, ai exist whenever x ∈ P . We provide an computationally efficient algorithm to find such a solution whenever it exists. At a high level, we begin with the input x and maintain at all times two points y ∈ P , z ∈ P , such that x = c y + (1 − c) z, for some c ∈ [0, 1]. After step t of the algorithm is completed, y is the convex combination of at most t corners of P , and z lies in the (n − t)-dimensional intersection of t hyperplanes of B(P ). Hence, after at most n steps, z will lie in a 0-dimensional space, and therefore must be a corner, so the algorithm will terminate after at most n + 1 steps.
To go from step t to step t+1, we pick an arbitrary corner, at, that lies in the intersection of the t hyperplanes where z lies. Then, we let ct be as large as possible without pushing the point
and update y appropriately to include at in its convex combination of corners. The new z must lie at the intersection of the original t hyperplanes where the old z lied, as well as a new h ∈ B(P ) that stopped us from further increasing ct.
Algorithm 1 provides the formal details. In its description E denotes the set of hyperplanes whose intersection contains z (the empty intersection is the entire space). The formal guarantees of the algorithm are given by Theorem 13, whose proof is presented in [CDW11] .
Theorem 13. Algorithm 1 correctly answers Question 1. The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in n, b and the running times of SO and CO on inputs of bit-complexity polynomial in n and b. Set ai := CO(E).
9:
if ai = z then 10:
Set ci := 1 − c.
11:
Output c1, . . . , cn+1, a1, . . . , an+1. 
Proof. Our proof is by induction on the number of distinct non-zero values in {π(A)}A∈T .
Base Case: There is a single non-zero value in this set, equal to some x ≤ 1. The mechanism that gives the item uniformly at random to a bidder whose reported type A satisfies π(A) = x (if such bidder shows up) implements this reduced form as long as it is feasible.
Inductive Hypothesis: For all 0 < k < θ, every feasible reduced form with k distinct non-zero values in {π(A)}A∈T can be implemented as a distribution over well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms.
Inductive
Step: We show that the inductive hypothesis extends to the case where there are exactly θ distinct non-zero values in {π(A)}A∈T . Let X denote the set of all distributions over well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. Then X can be interpreted as a closed, bounded subset of
, where each coordinate denotes the probability of using one of the 2 θ well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. Therefore, X is compact. For a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms M ∈ X, denote by M (A) the probability that a bidder reporting type A receives the item under M . Define the function F : X → R as:
Let us use the Euclidean distance in X as a subset of R 2 θ . As X is a compact space, and F is a continuous function, F attains its minimum in X. Let M denote one such minimizer of F . Then if F (M ) ≤ 0, M implements the reduced form. If F (M ) > 0, we will show a contradiction. Let S denote the subset of types argmax A {π(A) − M (A)}, i.e. the subset of types who are the most unsatisfied by M .
We show first that, if S contains every non-zero type, then the reduced form is infeasible. We may, w.l.o.g., assume that M always awards the item to a non-zero type if one shows up, as this will not decrease M (A) for any non-zero A. Therefore, we know that Observe that the number of distinct non-zero values in {π (A)}A∈T is exactly s < θ. So it follows by our inductive hypothesis that π can be implemented by a distribution over well-ordered (with respect to π ) hierarchical mechanisms. In fact, as π(A) ≥ π(A ) ⇒ π (A) ≥ π (A ), every hierarchical mechanism that is wellordered with respect to π is also well-ordered with respect to π. Call M the distribution over well-ordered hierarchical mechanisms implementing π . Now, set = (F (M ) − argmax Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that π can be implemented as a distribution over well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. Let then X denote the set of distributions over well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms that implement π. As in Lemma 1 the set X, viewed as a subset of
, where θ is the number of distinct non-zero values in π, is compact. We can also define the function G : X → R as:
Equipping X with the Euclidean distance of R 2 θ , G is a continuous function on X. As X is compact and G continuous, G attains its minimum in X.
We show that the minimum of G is exactly 0 (i.e. that a minimizer of G exactly implements π), following an induction similar to the one used in Lemma M (B ) ). The rest of the inductive step proceeds identically with that in the proof of Lemma 1, resulting in a contradiction. Hence, it can't be that the minimizer of G satisfies G(M ) > 0.
To proceed we need a definition. Let >:= A1 > A2 > . . . > A k be a total ordering of a set T k := {A1, . . . , A k } of k types, and consider a setting where we have m bidders whose types are distributed i.i.d. over T k . We say that a bidder-symmetric reduced form π : T k → [0, 1] respects > iff π(A1) ≥ π(A2) ≥ . . . ≥ π(A k ). We also say that an hierarchical mechanism H on T k is well-ordered with respect to > iff H(A1) ≤ H(A2) ≤ . . . ≤ H(A k ). 8 With respect to these definitions we show the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider m bidders whose types are distributed i.i.d. over T k := {A1, . . . , A k } and a total ordering >:= A1 > A2 > . . . > A k of T k . The set of feasible biddersymmetric reduced forms that respect > is a k-dimensional polytope whose corners are exactly the 2 k hierarchical mechanisms that are well-ordered with respect to >.
Proof. As a corollary of Theorem 1, a reduced form re-8 Notice that this definition of well-ordered hierarchical mechanism (with respect to >) is very similar to its counterpart in the main body (with respect to π), but different. Being well-ordered with respect to π certainly imposes the same constraints as being well ordered with respect to any > that π respects. The difference is that being well-ordered with respect to π may also impose some equality constraints, if π(A) = π(B) for types A = B.
spects > and is feasible if and only if π(Ai) ≥ π(Ai+1) ∀i ∈ [k];
(4)
where for notational convenience we denote π(A k+1 ) = 0.
We have hence shown that the set of feasible bidder-symmetric reduced forms that respect > is a k-dimensional polytope. We proceed to show that each well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism is a corner. Let H be such a mechanism and π be the reduced form that it induces. Then, for all i (including i = k, denoting H(A k+1 ) = LOSE) we either have H(Ai) = H(Ai+1), in which case π(Ai) = π(Ai+1), or H(Ai) < H(Ai+1), in which case j≤i m · Pr[Aj]π(Aj) = 1 − (1 − j≤i Pr[Aj]) m , because the item is always awarded to one of the top i types whenever one is present. Therefore, at least k of the inequalities defining the polytope are tight. And it is easy to see that there is a unique reduced form making these inequalities tight. It is also clear that every well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism is inside the polytope. So every well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism is a corner of the polytope.
Finally, we show that there are no other corners. Assume for contradiction that there was a corner π of the polytope that is not a well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism. Then by Corollary 1, we know that π can be written as a convex combination of well-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms, and hence as a convex combination of wellordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanisms. (As π respects > a hierarchical mechanism that is well-ordered w.r.t. π will also be well-ordered w.r.t. >). As every well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism is a corner of the polytope, and π is not one of them, this means that π can be written as a convex combination of other corners of the polytope, which contradicts that π is itself a corner.
Therefore we have shown that every feasible bidder symmetric reduced form respecting > lies inside the aforedescribed polytope, every well-ordered w.r.t. > hierarchical mechanism is a corner of this polytope, and there are no other corners. This establishes the proposition. Now we can put everything together to prove Theorems 3 and 2. Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that the bidders' types are sampled i.i.d. from T according to D1, and let π be a feasible bidder-symmetric reduced form. We do the following preprocessing operation on the set of types T : TypeMerge: Find a maximal set of types A1, . . . , A ∈ T such that π(A1) = . . . = π(A ). Then remove types A1, . . . , A from T and add super-type A1, . . . , A into T ; change D1 to never sample any of A1, . . . , A and sample the super-type A1, . . . , A with probability i Pr[Ai]; and set π( A1, . . . , A ) = π(A1). Repeat this procedure until every type in T has different π value, i.e. until the set {π(A)}A∈T has cardinality |T |.
Let T , π , D 1 be the type-set, reduced-form, type distri-bution resulting from the TypeMerge operation on input π. We claim that:
1. π is a feasible bidder-symmetric reduced form for bidders sampled i.i.d. from D 1 . This follows immediately from the feasibility of π. Indeed it follows from Theorem 1 and our discussion in Section 3.1.1 that a sufficient condition for the feasibility of π is for it to satisfy Eq. (1) for all subsets of types of the form
On the other hand the feasibility of π implies that π satisfies Eq. (1) for all subsets of types of the form {A | A ∈ T ∧ π(A) ≥ x}. This together with the nature of our TypeMerge operation implies that π satisfies the afore-mentioned sufficient conditions for feasibility.
2.
A mechanism that exactly implements π immediately gives a mechanism exactly implementing π. Indeed, to implement π we just run the mechanism implementing π after replacing in the reported type vector every type A that was removed from T by TypeMerge by its corresponding super-type.
A hierarchical mechanism
H that is well-ordered w.r.t. π can be expanded into a hierarchical mechanism H that is well- Now, suppose that the cardinality of T is k. Given that π assigns a distinct probability to every type in T , it induces a total ordering on T . In particular, suppose that T := {A1, . . . , A k }, where π (A1) > π (A2) > . . . > π (A k ). By Proposition 1, π lies inside a k-dimensional polytope whose corners are exactly the 2 k hierarchical mechanisms that are well-ordered with respect to the order >:= A1 > . . . > A k . By Carathéodory's Theorem, every point in the polytope can be written as a convex combination of at most k+1 corners. As a convex combination of corners is exactly a distribution over well-ordered hierarchical mechanisms w.r.t. >, we get that π can be written as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms that are well-ordered w.r.t. >, and hence also w.r.t. π . Now we can expand all hierarchical mechanisms in the support of the distribution, according to the procedure described in Step 3 above, to obtain that π can be written as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms that are well-ordered w.r.t. π. 2
Proof of Theorem 2: It follows from our discussion in Section 3.1.1 that a bidder-symmetric reduced formπ is infeasible if and only if it violates Eq. (1) for a subset of types of the form {A | A ∈ T ∧π(A) ≥ x}. Since there are at most c ≡ |T | such sets we can efficiently determine feasibility of a given reduced fromπ or provide a hyperplane separating it from the set of feasible reduced forms.
We now need to describe how to efficiently find a mechanism implementing a reduced formπ that is feasible. In view of the TypeMerge operation defined in the proof of Theorem 3, we can w.l.o.g. assume thatπ assigns a distinct probability to every type in T . (Otherwise we can always run TypeMerge to merge types sharing the sameπ-probability to super-types and apply the procedure outlined below to the output of the TypeMerge operation, and then go back to the originalπ). Under the assumption thatπ assigns distinct probabilities to all types in T , Proposition 1 implies thatπ lies inside a c-dimensional polytope, P , whose corners are the well-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanisms. Therefore we can directly apply Theorem 13 of Section 5 to writeπ as a convex combination of such hierarchical mechanisms, as long as we can describe the boundary oracle BO, corner oracle CO and separation oracle SO that are needed for Theorem 13. BO is trivial to implement, as we just have to include in the set of halfspaces defining the boundary of P those inequalities described in the proof of Proposition 1. For CO, on input B, we first check that every hyperplane h ∈ B satisfies BO(h) = yes. If not, output no. Otherwise we need to check if h∈B h contains a corner of P . We know that the corners of P are exactly the well-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanisms. So none of the corners lies in the intersection of the hyperplanes π(Ai) = π(Ai+1) and j≤i m · Pr[Aj]π(Aj) = 1 − (1 − j≤i Pr[Aj]) m , for any i. (Indeed, for a hierarchical mechanism H and its induced reduced form π, π(Ai) = π(Ai+1) implies that H(Ai) = H(Ai+1), yet j≤i m·Pr[Aj]π(Aj) = 1−(1− j≤i Pr[Aj]) m implies H(Ai) > H(Ai+1)). So, if B contains any pair of hyperplanes of this form, output no. Otherwise, for all i such that π(Ai) = π(Ai+1) ∈ B, set H(Ai) = H(Ai+1), otherwise set H(Ai) = H(Ai+1) − 1. This defines a well-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanism that is in h∈B h, so have CO output H. Finally, SO is easy to implement as we can just check each of the 2 · c inequalities written in the proof of Proposition 1 one by one.
So because we can implement BO, CO, SO in polynomial time, we can apply Theorem 13 to writeπ as a convex combination of at most c + 1 corners, which is exactly a distribution over at most c + 1 well-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanisms in polynomial time. 2
SINGLE ITEM, INDEPENDENT BIDDERS, GENERAL REDUCED FORMS
Here we provide the details of Section 3.1.2, and the proofs of Theorems 4, 5 and 6, postponing the proof of Theorem 7 to the full version [CDW11] . Before proving our theorems, we show that the concept of virtual πs is necessary. As in, Theorem 4 would be false if we tried to replaceπ with π. Then this reduced form is infeasible. Indeed, observe that C must always receive the item whenever t2 = C, which happens with probability 1/2. So if se have π2(C) = 1, we cannot also have π1(A) > 1/2. So the set {A, C} forms a constricting set. However, the sets of the form S i x are {C}, {C, D}, {C, D, A}, {C, D, A, B}, and they all satisfy the above inequality.
Proposition 2 shows us that ordering the types of all bidders by decreasing π doesn't allow us to correctly determine the feasibility of a reduced form. Similarly, a partial ordering of the types that only orders a single bidder's types by decreasing π doesn't give enough structure to efficiently determine the feasibility of the reduced form. What we need is a correct total ordering of the types of all bidders, and we can obtain it using virtual πs. Here is a quick observation about the virtual πs, followed by a proof of Theorem 4. Proof of Theorem 4: We know from [Bor07, CKM11] , that if a reduced form mechanism is infeasible, then there is some constricting set of the form
(Forgive the abuse of notation here. Formally, S is a collection of m sets of types, one for each bidder. To avoid cumbersome notation and take union casually in this proof, let us assume that a type A ∈ Ti carries the name of bidder i, for all i.) Now consider any minimal constricting set of this form, i.e. a choice of x1, . . . , xm such that replacing Sx i with Sx i − {A} (A ∈ Sx i ) results in S no longer being a constricting set. 9 Now let (i, A) ∈ argmin i, A∈Sx iπ i(A). Then by Observation 1 and by our choice of S, S − {A} is not a constricting set. Therefore, adding A to S − {A} must increase the left-hand bound by more than it increases the right-hand bound:
Now consider any other
Observe first that we must have A from some bidder k = i, as every A ∈ Ti withπi(A ) ≥πi(A) has πi(A ) ≥ πi(A) ≥ xi, so we would have A ∈ S. So for this A , we have:
. 9 For a minimal set S, there could be many possible choices of x1, . . . , xm. We simply use any of them.
And by our choice of A and the work above, we obtain:
This equation tells us directly that we could add A to S and still get a constricting set. In fact, it tells us something stronger. If S = j S j , where S j ⊆ Tj, is any constricting set containing S, then we could add A to S and still have a constricting set. This is because the change to the left-hand side of the inequality is the same, no matter what set we are adding A to. It is always Pr[t k = A ]π k (A ). And the change to the right-hand side is exactly Pr[t k = A ] times the probability that none of the types in ∪ j =k S j show up. As we add more types to S, the probability that none of the types in ∪ j =k S j show up will never increase. So for any constricting set S containing S, we can add A to S k and still get a constricting set.
So starting from a constricting set S and a type A ∈ Ti as above we can add every B ∈ Tj withπj(B) ≥πi(A) to S in order to obtain a constricting set of the form Sx = {B|B ∈ Tj ∧πj(B) ≥ x}, where x =πi(A). So every infeasible reduced form has a constricting set of this form. Taking the contrapositive proves the theorem. 2
We say that a hierarchical mechanism H is virtually-ordered Proof. Consider the following example with two bidders. Bidder one has a single type, A. Bidder two has two types, B and C and is each with probability 1/2. Then π1(A) = 1/3, π2(B) = 2/3 + , π2(C) = 2/3 − is a feasible reduced form. However,π1(A) >π2(C), so no distribution over virtually-ordered hierarchical mechanisms can possibly have π2(C) > 1/2. Now that we have motivated Theorems 5 and 6, we proceed to prove them, after providing the key steps as technical lemmas.
Lemma 2. Every feasible reduced form π for independent bidders and a single item can be implemented (not necessarily exactly implemented) as a distribution over strict, partiallyordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of Lemma 1. Here are the main differences: We do induction on i di, where di is the number of distinct non-zero values in the set {πi(A)}A∈T i . For the inductive step, X is now taken to be the set of distributions over strict, partially-ordered hierarchical mechanisms, and it is still compact, viewed as a subset of the Euclidean space. The function F : X → R is now defined as
Again, if we use the Euclidean distance on X, as a subset of the Euclidean space, F is continuous. Since F is continuous and X is compact, F achieves its minimum inside X. Let M be a minimizer. For all i, we define Si = {A ∈ Ti|πi(A) − Mi(A) = F (M )}. In terms of the sets {Si}i we can define an alternative reduced form π as follows. For all i, A ∈ Ti: if A ∈ Si, then set π i (A) = πi(A); otherwise, set π i (A) = max B∈S i |π i (A)≥π i (B) {π(B)}, unless {B ∈ Si|πi(A) ≥ πi(B)} is empty in which case set π i (A) equal to 0. With these changes, the proof is truly identical to that of Lemma 1, and we avoid repeating the steps for brevity.
Corollary 2. Every feasible reduced form π for independent bidders and a single item can be exactly implemented as a distribution over strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Corollary 1 after making the same modifications going from Lemma 1 to Lemma 2.
We proceed to prove an analog of Proposition 1 in this setting. We need a definition. For all i, let > i := Ai,1 > i Ai,2 > i . . . > i A i,k i be a total ordering of the set Ti := {Ai,1, . . . , A i,k i } of bidder i's types. We say that a reduced form π respects > i iff πi(Ai,1) ≥ πi(Ai,2) ≥ . . . ≥ πi(A i,k i ). We also say that an hierarchical mechanism H is partiallyordered with respect to > i iff H(Ai,1, i) ≤ H(Ai,2, i) ≤ . . . ≤ H(A i,k i , i). 10 With respect to these definitions we show the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For all i, let > i := Ai,1 > i Ai,2 > i . . . > i A i,k i be a total ordering of the set Ti := {Ai,1, . . . , A i,k i } of bidder i's types. The set of feasible reduced forms that respect > 1 , . . . , > m is a ( i ki)-dimensional polytope whose corners are exactly the strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. > 1 , . . . , > m hierarchical mechanisms.
Proof. We know from [Bor07, CKM11] that a reduced form π respects > 1 , . . . , > m and is feasible iff
where for notational convenience we denote πi(A i,k i +1 ) = 0.
In fact, to make our lives easier in a later proof, we will actually replace (7) with:
∀x1 ∈ [k1 − 1], . . . , xm ∈ [km − 1] 10 Notice that this definition of partially-ordered hierarchical mechanism (with respect to {> i }i) is similar to its counterpart in the main body (with respect to π), but different. Being partially-ordered with respect to π certainly imposes the same constraints as being partially-ordered with respect to any {> i }i that π respects. The difference is that being partially-ordered with respect to π may also impose some equality constraints, if πi(A) = πi(B) for types A = B.
Pr[ti = Ai,j]πi(Ai,j) ≤ 1 (9)
In the above above replacement, we are basically observing that if (9) holds, then so does (7) for any case where at least one i has xi = ki. In addition, (8) covers all other cases.
We have hence shown that the set of feasible reduced forms that respect > 1 , . . . , > m is a i ki-dimensional polytope. We proceed to show that any strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. > 1 , . . . , > m hierarchical mechanism H whose reduced-form is π is a corner. For convenience in the proof assume that Ti ∩ T k = ∅, for all i = k. This is easy to achieve by having every type of bidder i carry the name of bidder i, for all i. Let now y = minx Pr[∃i, H(ti, i) ≤ x] = 1, i.e. the minimum y so that with probability 1 some bidder i will report a type Ai,j such that H(Ai,j, i) ≤ y. In terms of this y we define y * as follows: y * := y, if y = LOSE (case 1), and y * := y − 1, if y = LOSE (case 2). We observe then that a type Ai,j ∈ Ti with H(Ai,j, i) > y * cannot possibly win the item, as we are either guaranteed to see some bidder whose type lies on a higher level of the hierarchy (case 1) or the type is mapped to LOSE and is hence given no item (case 2). For all such i, Ai,j ∈ Ti, we therefore have πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1) = · · · = πi(A i,k i +1 ) = 0.
We say that a set of types S = ∪i{Ai,1, . . . , Ai,x i } for some x1, . . . , xm is near-constricting, if the corresponding Inequality (7) is tight for x1, . . . , xm. Then, for any i, Ai,j ∈ Ti with H(Ai,j, i) ≤ y * , we know that H −1 ([H(Ai,j, i)]) is a near-constricting set, because the item is always awarded to a type in H −1 ([H(Ai,j, i)]) whenever at least one type from this set is reported. Moreover, if H(Ai,j 1 , i) = . . . = H(Ai,j , i), for some types Ai,j 1 , . . . , Ai,j ∈ Ti, then πi(Ai,j 1 ) = . . . = πi(Ai,j ). Finally, because H is strict, if some i, Ai,j ∈ Ti satisfy H(Ai,j, i) ≤ y * , then H −1 (H(Ai,j, i)) ∩ T k = ∅, for all k = i.
Let us now define the following mapping from types to tight inequalities:
• If a type Ai,j ∈ Ti satisfies H(Ai,j, i) > y * , then we map Ai,j to the constraint πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1), i.e. the tightness of inequality πi(Ai,j) ≥ πi(Ai,j+1).
• If a type Ai,j ∈ Ti satisfies H(Ai,j, i) ≤ y * , then:
if H(Ai,j, i) = H(Ai,j+1, i), we map Ai,j to the constraint πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1), i.e. the tightness of inequality πi(Ai,j) ≥ πi(Ai,j+1);
otherwise, we map Ai,j to the tightness of Inequality (7) for the set of types H −1 ([H(Ai,j, i)]).
The above discussion ensures that our mapping is injective. Hence π makes at least i ki of the inequalities defining our polytope tight. And it is not hard to see that there is a unique feasible reduced form making these inequalities tight. So π is a corner of the polytope. Thus, every strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. > 1 , . . . , > m hierarchical mechanism is a corner of the polytope.
We now make the same observation as in Proposition 1 to argue that there are no other corners. Corollary 2 implies that every point in the polytope can be written as a convex combination of strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. > 1 , . . . , > m hierarchical mechanisms, all of which are corners of the polytope. As no corner of the polytope can be written as a convex combination of other corners of the polytope, there must not be any other corners.
And now we are ready to prove Theorems 5 and 6. Proof of Theorem 5: Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 3 we can assume without loss of generality that, for all i, π assigns a distinct probability to every type in Ti.
(Otherwise we can define a similar TypeMerge operation, like the one defined in the proof of Theorem 3, whereby types in Ti that receive the same π value are merged into super-types.) Under this assumption, Proposition 3 implies that π lies inside a ( i |Ti|)-dimensional polytope, P , whose corners are the strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms. By Carathéodory's Theorem, every point in the polytope can be written as a convex combination of at most ( i |Ti|) + 1 corners. As a convex combination of corners is exactly a distribution over strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanisms, this proves the theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 6: The first part of the theorem follows immediately as a corollary of Theorem 4.
We now need to describe how to efficiently find a mechanism implementing a reduced formπ that is feasible. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2 we can assume without loss of generality that, for all i,π assigns a distinct probability to every type in Ti. (Otherwise we can merge types in Ti that receive the sameπ value into supertypes, like we did in the proof of Theorem 2, then run the procedure outlined below, and finally un-merge types.) Under this assumption, Proposition 3 implies thatπ lies inside a ( i |Ti|)-dimensional polytope, P , whose corners are the strict, partially-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanisms. Therefore we can directly apply Theorem 13 of Section 5 to writeπ as a convex combination of such hierarchical mechanisms, as long as we can describe the boundary oracle BO, corner oracle CO and separation oracle SO that are needed for Theorem 13. BO is trivial to implement, as we just have to include in the set of halfspaces defining the boundary of P those inequalities described in the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, for convenience in the remaining of the proof, we include the inequalities of the form (6), (8) and (9). For CO, on input B, we first check that every hyperplane h ∈ B satisfies BO(h) = yes. If not, output no. Otherwise, we need to check if h∈B h contains a corner of P . We know that the corners of P are exactly the strict, partially-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanisms. To check if there is such a corner in h∈B h we need to do some work.
First, let us use the same notation as in Proposition 3, denoting Ti = {Ai,1, . . . , A i,k i }, where ki = |Ti| andπi(Ai,1) > . . . >πi(A i,k i ). Also, let us call a set of types S nearconstricting if either S = ∪i{Ai,1, . . . , Ai,x i } for some x1 ≤ k1 − 1, . . . , xm ≤ km − 1 and Inequality (8) is tight for x1, . . . , xm, or if S = ∪iTi and Inequality (9) is tight. Now given a set B of hyperplanes, if B contains a nearconstricting set hyperplane for the sets of types S1, . . . , S k , we check first whether these sets satisfy S1 ⊂ S2 . . . ⊂ S k (possibly after renaming). If not, then there are some two near-constricting sets Si, Sj with A ∈ Si − Sj, B ∈ Sj − Si for some types A = B. Because Si and Sj are different than ∪iTi and they are near-constricting they must be of the form making Inequality (8) tight. Hence, both Si and Sj miss at least one type of every bidder, so that the right-hand side of the inequality for Si must be < 1 and similarly the righthand side of the inequality for Sj must be < 1. In addition, we cannot have A and B be types of the same bidder, as we only consider near-constricting sets that respect the partial ordering within every bidder's type-set. Therefore, A and B belong to different bidders, and because the probability of seeing a type in Si is < 1 (and the same holds for Sj), there is a non-zero probability that A and B are both present, but no other type of Si or Sj is present. Then the nearconstricting set equation for set Si requires that we must give the item to A, 11 and the near-constricting set equation for Sj requires that we must give the item to B, which is impossible. So if we do not have S1 ⊂ S2 . . . ⊂ S k , the hyperplanes do not intersect in a feasible mechanism, and therefore CO should output no.
Otherwise, CO looks at the other hyperplanes (of the form πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1)) that belong to B, and chooses an arbitrary strict, partially-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanism that satisfies the following constraints:
H(A i ,j , i ) and Ai,j / ∈ S while A i ,j ∈ S . But then it must be π(Ai,j) > 0 (because of assumption (ii)), so there is a positive probability that bidder i of type Ai,j is the highest in the hierarchy when every bidder except for i has declared a type. Still, given that H(Ai,j, i) < H(A i ,j , i ), even if i declares A i ,j , i will get the item, contradicting that S is near-constricting. We argue next that H also needs to satisfy the third constraint above. That constraint 3(a) is satisfied follows immediately from assumption (ii). We argue next that 3(b) needs to be satisfied. Indeed, suppose there exist Ai,j, Ai,j+1 ∈ Ti and A i ,j ∈ T i such that πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1) > 0 and H(Ai,j, i) < H(A i ,j , i ) < H(Ai,j+1, i). As πi(Ai,j+1) > 0, it follows that H(Ai,j+1, i) < LOSE, so H(A i ,j , i ) < LOSE, which implies that π i (A i ,j ) > 0 (otherwise it would be that H(A i ,j , i ) = LOSE given (ii)). Now, because bidder i wins the item with non-zero probability as type A i ,j , there is a non-zero probability that A i ,j is on the highest level of the hierarchy after sampling from all bidders except for i. In this case, i will win the item by reporting Ai,j, and lose by reporting Ai,j+1. In all other cases, i is at least as likely to win the item by reporting Ai,j as Ai,j+1, and therefore we see that bidder i gets the item strictly more often when reporting Ai,j than Ai,j+1, violating the constraint πi(Ai,j) = πi(Ai,j+1). So if there is a corner π in h∈B h ∩ P it can be implemented by a strict, partially-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanism H satisfying the above constraints. The other direction of our claim is even simpler. If a strict, partially-ordered w.r.t. π hierarchical mechanism H satisfies all constraints above, then its induced reduced-form π will immediately satisfy all equalities in B.
Hence to implement CO one just needs to check if there is a strict, partially-ordered w.r.t.π hierarchical mechanism H satisfying the four constraints above. This task is easy to do efficiently. If a mechanism is found it satisfies all equalities in B and it is a corner of the polytope by Proposition 3.
SO is also simple to implement. On input π, we first check that Inequalities (6) are satisfied (i.e. that π respects the total orderings on the bidders' type-spaces induced byπ). Then we use the separation oracle provided by Theorem 4 to verify that π is feasible. As all three oracles BO, CO, SO run in polynomial time, we can apply Theorem 13 to writẽ π as a convex combination of at most i |Ti| + 1 corners, which is exactly a distribution over at most i |Ti| + 1 strict, partially-ordered hierarchical mechanisms in polynomial time. 2
OPTIMAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL MECH-ANISMS
We sketch how to use our results from the previous sections and recent results of [DW11] to obtain the proofs of Theorems 8, 9, 10 and 11. Simply put, [DW11] provides a LP formulation for the problem of finding the optimal BIC mechanism for value distributions of finite support. In addition, [DW11] exploits any symmetry that may exist in the value distribution to reduce the size of the resulting LPs. However, without a separation oracle to determine the feasibility of the πs, these LP formulations will have size exponential in the number of bidders in the settings we consider, even when the bidders are i.i.d., because the LPs need to maintain variables for the ex-post allocation rule described by the φ's (See Section 2). Using the separation oracles of Theorems 2 and 6, we can eliminate the need for φ's in these LPs, turning the number of variables to polynomial in the number of bidders, and solving them in time polynomial in m, n and maxi |supp(Fi)|, thereby establishing Theorem 8. Theorem 9 follows immediately by combining our separation oracles with the symmetric LPs of Section 5 of [DW11] . Theorem 10 follows by discretizing the value distributions, applying the aforementioned symmetric LPs and the -BIC to BIC reduction of Section 6 of [DW11] . Finally, Theorem 11 is obtained by truncating and discretizing the value distributions, running the symmetric LP on the resulting distributions, and using the -BIC to BIC reduction of Section 6 of [DW11] . (This procedure is described in detail in Appendix J of [DW11] .)
For completeness, in Figure 3 we describe how to modify the LP of [DW11] to exploit our separation oracles. We only describe the LP for the item-symmetric case to illustrate some extra work that is needed to handle symmetries. It is clear how to "un-symmetrize" the LP to treat the nonsymmetric problem. The LP shown in Figure 3 is identical to the item-symmetric LP of [DW11] except that we have replaced the naïve feasibility constraints for the reduced form used in [DW11] (these were explicitly finding consistent φ(P )'s for every profile) with a separation oracle SO that takes as input a reduced form and decides whether it is feasible or not, in which case it also provides a separation hyperplane from the feasible set. The reader should refer to [DW11] for the correctness of the unmodified LP. So we only need to justify here that our separation oracle works properly. While this is obvious in the non-symmetric case (as it follows directly from Theorem 6), it is slightly trickier for the symmetric LP of Figure 3 , as the LP does not explicitly maintain the whole reduced form. In particular, for every bidder i, we only maintain the reduced form for all types of bidder i in the set Ei = { vi | vi1 ≥ . . . ≥ vin}, and it is assumed that (because of symmetries) the reduced form of a type wi / ∈ Ei is just {πij( wi) = π iσ −1 (j) ( vi)}j for whatever vi ∈ Ei and σ ∈ S satisfy σ( vi) = wi, where S is the set of all item permutations. (For why it is OK to assume that such symmetries are satisfied by the optimal reduced form, the reader is referred to [DW11] .)
We proceed to describe how our separation oracle works in the item-symmetric case. The input to SO is the succinct description {πij( vi)} i,j, v i ∈E i of a reduced form and the value distribution D. If we define Π := ∪ i,j, v i ∈E i {πij( vi)}, where theπ's are as in Definition 3, it follows from Theorem 4 and the symmetries satisfied by the complete reduced form (which is implied by the succinct one provided in the input to SO) that, for each item j, we only need to check |Π| constricting sets for feasibility. (In fact, because the mechanism is item-symmetric, it suffices to only check these constraints for a single item.) Checking a particular set can be done in time polynomial in |Π|, i.e. without explicitly listing all types that belong to the set, due to the symmetries. If none of the sets is found constricting, output "yes." Otherwise, output the linear constraint violated by the constricting set. This is a hyperplane certifying that the πij( vi)'s are infeasible. If SO outputs "yes," this means that it is possible to allocate each item individually and satisfy the πij( vi)s. Because bidders have no demand constraints, this also means that we can simultaneously satisfy the πij( vi)'s of all items by simply allocating each item independently. It is now clear that SO acts correctly as a separation oracle deter-mining whether or not the πij( vi)s are feasible. Moreover, notice that |Ei| = poly(n c ), for all i, where c = |supp(Fij)|. Hence, |Π| is polynomial in m and n c . So our SO runs in time polynomial in m and n c .
Our LP has size polynomial in m, n c and our separation oracle runs in time polynomial in m, n c . So we can solve the LP to compute the optimal reduced form, {πij( vi)} i,j, v i ∈E i . To execute the mechanism corresponding to the computed reduced form, we use Theorem 6, treating each item separately and allocating each item independently of the others.
Variables:
• πij( vi), for all bidders i, items j, and vi ∈ Ei (mn|Ei|), the ex-interim probability that bidder i gets item j when reporting type vi.
• qi( vi), for all bidders i, vi ∈ Ei (m|Ei|), the exinterim expected price that bidder i pays when reporting type vi.
Constraints:
• 0 ≤ πij( vi) ≤ 1, for all i, j, vi ∈ Ei, guaranteeing that each πij( vi) is a probability (mn|Ei|).
• j vijπij( vi) − qi( vi) ≥ 0, for all i, vi ∈ Ei, guaranteeing that the mechanism is ex-interim Individually Rational (m|Ei|).
• j vijπij( vi) − qi( vi) ≥ j vijπij( v i ) − qi( v i ), for all i, vi ∈ Ei, v i ∈ Ei, guaranteeing that the mechanism is BIC (m|Ei| 2 ).
• SO({πij( vi)} i,j, v i , D) = "yes", guaranteeing that there is a feasible mechanism implementing the πij( vi)s.
Maximizing:
i, v i ∈E i qi( vi)P r[ wi ← Di, wi ∈ ∪σ∈S{σ( vi)}], the expected revenue. 
